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REMAKING THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
For a number of years, commentators have looked to the “developmental
states” of East Asia as a counterweight against the forces of economic globaliza-
tion. These states have been seen as cause for hope that nations could promote
economic development, even from a subordinate position in the international
division of labor. Until the 1990s, this developmental state presided over one of
the most spectacular economic success stories of this century, while other econo-
mies (e.g., in Latin America and the European periphery) languished, often as lit-
tle more than export platforms.1
In the 1990s, however, the developmental state seemed to have had its day in
the sun. The Japanese and Korean states appeared too inflexible to cope with rap-
idly changing informational industries and decentralized “post-Fordist” indus-
trial structures. Korean and Japanese firms ran into increasing difficulties through
the 1990s in rapidly changing high-technology markets. The developmental
states also appeared too weak to manage the increasingly internationalized econo-
mies over which they presided, as evidenced in the financial crisis of 1997 and
1998.2 The emergence of flexible regional economies and dispersed transnational
networks of technology and finance appeared to have simultaneously undermined
the developmental state from below and from above.
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However, a different set of countries has emerged in the 1990s that appear
likely candidates for mobility in the hierarchy of the international economy. The
Republic of Ireland is among those economies that have begun to change their
relation to the global economy based on growing strengths in information tech-
nology (IT) industries. Economic growth rates in Ireland3 have improved dramati-
cally since the economically and socially disastrous 1980s and have been among
the most rapid in the world in the mid-1990s. There has been a significant
improvement in export performance, and domestic demand has increased since
1994 after the mass unemployment and emigration of the 1980s and the caution of
the early 1990s. Consumer prices, despite some inflationary pressures in recent
years, have risen slowly. All of the above indicators compare favorably with the
performance of other leading economies in the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), including even comparatively “successful”
economies such as the United States, the Netherlands, and even the Asian Tigers
in the 1990s.4 Furthermore, the “jobless growth” of earlier decades has been
replaced by the highest rate of employment growth and the highest proportion of
the population employed in the history of the state. The mass emigration of the
1980s has given way to a substantial net inflow of migrants, largely consisting of
emigrants returning to Ireland but also including non-Irish-born immigrants.
Unemployment has fallen more slowly but has recently reached its lowest level in
seventeen years.
Growth in Ireland is driven not just by foreign investment but by two rela-
tively distinct modes of integration into the global economy—the partial local
embedding of global corporate networks and the increasingly successful inte-
gration of local networks of indigenous firms into global business and technol-
ogy networks. These two globalizations are further embedded within a set of
national neocorporatist institutions that have managed the relation to the global
economy of both the macro economy and of unionized workers. Since 1987, a
series of national “social partnership” agreements have negotiated wage
restraint, public spending limits, and some efforts to bridge social exclusion at
the local level.
The most effective developmental states of the 1990s have been transformed
from the bureaucratic models that characterized the East Asian economies to the
flexible versions we find in economies such as Ireland and Israel. The flexible
developmental state (FDS) is defined by its ability to nurture post-Fordist net-
works of production and innovation, to attract international investment, and to
link these local and global technology and business networks together in ways
that promote development. This ability is sustained by the multiple embedded-
ness of the state in professional-led networks of innovation and in international
capital, and by the state’s flexible organizational structure that enables the effec-
tive management of this multiplicity. This uneasy structure of multiple alliances is
threatened, however, by the difficulties of a fragmented state structure in handling
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the tensions arising from uneven internationalization of society and growing
inequality.
The Irish software industry is an informative case study through which to ana-
lyze the key characteristics of this emerging development strategy.5 The industry
has grown rapidly, is one of the most dynamic software industries outside the
United States, and is divided relatively equally in employment terms between for-
eign and Irish-owned firms. It occupies an increasingly significant role in the Irish
economy. Software is a significant employer in its own right, behind only elec-
tronic equipment, food, and chemicals as industrial employers in 1997. It is also
growing more quickly in terms of employment than any manufacturing sector.6
The industry accounted for 12 percent of Irish exports in 1998 and, perhaps more
important, was rapidly becoming a model for industrial policy in other sectors of
the economy.
The article begins by critiquing accounts that overemphasize either local or
global processes through an analysis of the dynamics of recent industrial and eco-
nomic development in Ireland. I then develop the concept of the FDS in some
detail as an alternative theoretical approach to understanding the central features
of Irish economic development. The remainder of the article describes the struc-
ture of the software industry in Ireland and applies the three dimensions of the the-
ory to explain the development and dilemmas of the Irish software industry—how
the state intervened in the process of globalization itself, the social and institu-
tional conditions of this state role, and the threat posed to development by social
inequality. Finally, some issues concerning the sustainability and generalizability
of the model are considered.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBALIZATIONS OF IRELAND
For some authors, the success of the Irish economy since the early 1990s is
based on its mastery of localized flexible production and innovation. Charles
Sabel argues that Irish success is based on the ability of Irish firms to learn the les-
sons of decentralized post-Fordist production and create local alliances that sup-
port learning, efficiency, and innovation.7 Local strength becomes the basis of
global competitiveness. However, a variety of commentators from different
ends of the political spectrum emphasize Ireland’s location within the process of
globalization as the critical feature of this turnaround. A persistence with export
orientation, free trade, and foreign investment appears to be the key to Irish devel-
opment in the 1990s, for better or worse. Denis O’Hearn explains the emergence
of the Celtic Tiger in the following terms:
American corporations made major moves to increase their presence in the European mar-
ket; they tended to agglomerate their new projects to take advantage of the flexibility this
allowed; and Ireland was fortunate enough to receive a major share of American-owned
electronics projects in Europe because they agglomerated around other major firms such as
Intel.8
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The similarities in the causal explanations provided by a more conservative ana-
lyst, Paul Krugman, are striking (although their evaluations of the process differ
markedly):
Thanks in part to luck, in part to policies . . ., Ireland got a head start over other European
locations in attracting what became a surge of inward foreign direct investment; the early
investments both generated a cascade through informational effects and, eventually, cre-
ated external economies that further reinforced Ireland’s advantages.9
In fact, it will prove necessary to combine these “local” and “global” theories
to provide a full account of the multiple ways in which local and global processes
shape different modes of integration into the global economy and how they are
sustained by particular institutions. Irish industry is characterized by two such
broad modes of integration into the global economy, combining local and global
networks in different ways. The first is based on attracting foreign investment and
attempting to embed it in the local economy, and the second and more recent
model is based on the growth of indigenous Irish-owned firms that compete inter-
nationally and are increasingly closely integrated into international technology
and business networks.10
Employment in foreign-owned industry grew 24.8 percent in manufacturing
and 384.5 percent in financial and internally traded services (including software)
between 1989 and 1998.11 Denis O’Hearn provides a cogent critique of reliance
on such transnational corporation (TNC) investment as a model of economic
development.12 He argues that Irish economic growth is largely an illusion as it is
dominated by investment by TNCs, and economic statistics are grossly inflated by
the exports of a very narrow band of economic sectors and even key firms within
those sectors—such as Intel in computers and Microsoft in software. Indeed, for-
eign profits dominate the Irish economy to such an extent that the gross domestic
product (GDP) overstates the size of the Irish economy by some 13 percent, as it
does not account for the repatriation of transnationals’ profits. This is further
aggravated by the presence of certain sectors (including software duplication) that
are essentially “entrepôt” sectors, sectors that account for approximately 10 per-
cent of manufacturing employment but around 30 percent of output.13
While foreign investment is certainly open to a wide range of criticisms, there
are some indications that at least pockets of more sophisticated work have
emerged among TNCs in Ireland. Intramural spending on research and develop-
ment (R&D) among foreign-owned companies increased from £180m in 1993 to
£256m in 1995 and from 2.1 percent of sales in 1993 to 2.5 percent in 1995.14 TNC
sales are certainly inflated by transfer pricing15 and various other forms of creative
accounting, but this, in turn, may obscure some of the resources they generate
within the economy. In particular, statistics based on percentages of TNC sales are
likely to understate the sophistication of their operations, given the inflation of
these sales figures. The Irish economy expenditures of TNCs declined as a per-
centage of (artificially inflated) sales between 1990 and 1996 (from 37.9 percent
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to 35.2 percent), but the absolute spending of TNCs in the Irish economy rose 55.3
percent during that period.16 There is some evidence therefore of a local upgrad-
ing and embedding of some TNC operations, although this is limited, as O’Hearn
rightly points out.
Nonetheless, O’Hearn is too quick to reduce the dynamics of Irish develop-
ment to a TNC-led “entrepôt” model, dominated by companies such as Microsoft,
Intel, and Dell. This cannot explain the existence of some relatively sophisticated
TNC operations. Nor is the growth of indigenous industry simply derivative of
TNC investment, as evidenced by the data on the relatively limited local linkages
of TNCs. Critics of Ireland’s reliance on foreign investment cannot have it both
ways. Given the legitimate aspects of the critique of the developmental impact of
foreign investment, it then cannot be argued that Irish development has derived
almost completely from key investments such as Intel and Microsoft. Even within
the TNC sector, these firms remain relatively isolated and have little to do with the
more interesting TNCs such as Ericsson, Digital, and so on. Their dispropor-
tionate impact on Irish export and growth figures should not blind us to their rel-
ative lack of contribution to the very real transformation of production and inno-
vation capabilities within parts of the Irish economy. Finally, the neocorporatist
“social partnership” arrangements in place since 1987 cannot be explained by
O’Hearn’s model as they are only of tangential relevance to most of the TNCs.
Most TNCs are nonunion employers for whom wage costs are a relatively low
priority, and they have generally paid well above the terms of the national wage
agreements.
The spectacular growth in the output of TNCs can obscure the impressive per-
formance of Irish indigenous industry in which employment grew 10.4 percent in
manufacturing and 197.7 percent in internationally traded services. This indige-
nous industry performance is very impressive in comparative terms, all the more
so since it is currently on a very rapid growth trajectory as most of the employment
growth has occurred since 1994. Furthermore, this is not growth that is dependent
on links to TNCs in Ireland (which are generally weak)—exports of Irish-owned
manufacturing firms grew faster than both output and employment between 1990
and 1996.17 Industrial R&D in the whole economy increased to 1.02 percent of
GDP from 0.48 percent in 1986 and 0.53 percent in 1990. This was achieved
through a per annum real rate of growth of R&D spending of 15 percent among
foreign firms and 16 percent among Irish-owned firms.18
The claims of authors such as Charles Sabel that the unexpected success of
industry in Ireland is due to an ability to master flexible production contains an
element of truth. Indigenous firms tend to be small and medium sized with at least
some evidence of networking among firms.19 There is at least some evidence of
significant diffusion of teamwork at the level of the organization of production,
although not sufficient to warrant the more enthusiastic claims made on Irish
industry’s behalf.20 The picture that emerges of indigenous industry is of an over-
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all upgrading in the organization of production and of management and marketing
capabilities, resulting in growth spread across a range of sectors. Investment,
although clearly not the driver of development, has picked up significantly, par-
ticularly in the most dynamic sectors.21
There are a number of sectors, in particular financial services and IT, that
exhibit a combination of buoyant investment, high levels of R&D, significant lev-
els of “collaborative production,” and “clustering” or dense networking and that
are the most dynamic in the Irish economy.22 The software industry is clearly
located at this “post-Fordist leading edge” of the indigenous sector, within a con-
text of overall upgrading of capabilities across a broad range of industries.
Industrial growth has translated into a much improved employment perfor-
mance. Between 1986 and 1995, full-time employment increased by 2.5 percent
among men and 21.2 percent among women, while part-time employment
increased by 24.4 percent among men and 36.6 percent among women. The Irish
economy has indeed been creating part-time jobs rapidly, but it has also created
significant numbers of full-time jobs, even more so in recent years. Furthermore,
the jobs created have not simply been “bad” jobs. In fact, employment growth has
been characterized by an overall upgrading of the occupational structure com-
bined with a significant polarization of occupations and wages. The most rapidly
expanding occupational categories between 1981 and 1995 include catering,
personal services, sales workers, and security workers—which added 59,000
employees to their numbers during these years (an increase of 35.5 percent).
However, by 1995, there were also 94,000 more managers, professionals, and
associate professionals—an even bigger increase of 44 percent. Meanwhile, more
classically “Fordist” occupations such as clerks, typists, operatives, transport
workers, and skilled and craft workers added only 7,000 extra jobs, and farmers
and laborers decreased in number by 68,000 or 27.3 percent.23
Inequality has been rising rapidly within the Irish economy, in terms both of
the share of national income going to capital rather than labor24 and of wage
inequality. Ireland has seen what is probably the most rapid rise in wage inequality
within the OECD, despite being second only to the United States in inequality in
the 1980s.25 Private consumption’s share of GDP has decreased from a relatively
stable figure of around 59 percent from 1985 to 1992 to 55.4 percent in 1996.26
Furthermore, the bottom half of the income distribution has seen its share of
national household consumption reduced from 28.7 percent to 27.2 percent.
Although GDP has grown rapidly during that period and absolute consumption
has increased in real terms for all deciles of the income distribution, the increases
have been meager indeed for the poorest 40 percent, a trend reflected in the con-
tinuing poverty (even by relatively restrictive definitions) of 15 percent to 16 per-
cent of the Irish population between 1987 and 1994.27 Nonetheless, while the Irish
economy has undoubtedly created many “bad” jobs, it is also creating a signifi-
cant number of “good” jobs.
162 POLITICS & SOCIETY
The software industry has generated a disproportionate number of these
“good” jobs and is one of the leading sectors within both foreign and indigenous
industry. Before turning to a detailed investigation of the development of the
industry, I will develop the central concept applied in that analysis—the flexible
developmental state.
BUREAUCRATIC AND FLEXIBLE DEVELOPMENTAL STATES
“Local” and “global” perspectives on industrial development are one-
dimensional and insufficiently dynamic in their analyses. Combining these per-
spectives to investigate the multiple ways in which local and global processes
shape one another over time allows us to identify spaces and opportunities for
development strategies, even within an increasingly integrated global economy.
Choices remain as to how best to integrate into global flows and networks. The
state remains a central actor in the process of shaping these choices, building
better or worse development paths out of these fragments of local and global net-
works. However, the ways in which the state mediates between local and global
networks and the institutional foundations of this role in Ireland are different in a
number of significant respects from the East Asian bureaucratic developmental
states.
It is necessary then to explain the emergence of each set of global connections
that characterize the Irish economy and its software industry, and their surprising
ability to coexist. Furthermore, we need to provide a comprehensive theoretical
framework that can explain both the positive experiences of economic growth and
occupational and industrial upgrading and the disturbing massive social polariza-
tion that accompanies them.
It is to address these theoretical weaknesses and to accomplish these analytical
goals that I develop the concept of the flexible developmental state that is applied
to the software industry case through the rest of this article. The most influential
analyses of the role of the state in development have analyzed the success of the
Asian Tiger economies such as Japan and Korea. Developmental states are the
most likely candidates for boosting an economy beyond the narrow logic of pri-
vate investment and thereby improving its position in the international division of
labor. They achieve their goals in the contemporary era not by taking on the tasks
of development themselves but by shaping the capabilities of society and the mar-
ket to do so. Researchers have moved from an emphasis on an authoritarian direc-
tive style of state intervention to an understanding of how the state pokes and
prods domestic firms to compete in the global economy and to constantly upgrade
their organizational and technical capabilities to that end. The state assists in the
birth and growth of domestic, national firms through its role as “midwife” of new
firms and sectors and by tending to the “husbandry” of these growing industries.28
Through policies such as selective and strategic use of protectionism, the provi-
sion of industrial subsidies, and programs tied to performance, as well as the cre-
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ation of close ties between financial capital, industrial capital, and the state, econ-
omies such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were able to industrialize rapidly based
on improved productivity in manufacturing and “industrialization by learning.”29
However, the state cannot achieve these ends in isolation; in fact, it depends on
its relation to society for its success. In particular, developmental states are char-
acterized by what Peter Evans calls “embedded autonomy.” Such states are
embedded in local capital through the close social ties between state bureaucrats
and domestic business owners and managers. While an educated labor force orga-
nized for learning is critical, labor is excluded from the key institutions of the
bureaucratic developmental state.30 These states retain their autonomy due to
the presence of a classic Weberian bureaucracy—based on meritocratic recruit-
ment and promotion and norms of objective, procedural rationality.31 While
embeddedness allows the state to gather information and mobilize resources,
autonomy safeguarded by bureaucracy guarantees that national development
goals remain central to state action.32 For this reason, I label the developmental
states of East Asia bureaucratic developmental states (BDSs).33
But success can bring its own dilemmas. The developmental state promotes
local firms and encourages them to compete globally. In becoming global firms,
however, their alliances with the state are undermined as they become more and
more closely aligned with the interests of their international partners. In the late
1990s, the Asian development project’s basis in the domestic alliance between
state and capital was undermined as Asian firms internationalized, became more
integrated into international financial markets, and ran into a massive debt crisis
as Asian and U.S. capitalist institutions clashed, undermining the high debt
financing of the Asian corporations. The much-admired coherence of the bureau-
cracy now became a liability as its responsiveness to changing local and global
conditions proved to be poor.
The theory of the developmental state has been a valuable one that has shed a
great deal of light on the conditions of effective national development strategies.
Nevertheless, the theory is relatively weak in explaining the role of the state in
newly emerging economies such as Ireland and Israel, as well as in what Evans
describes as “intermediate cases” such as India and Brazil.34 Therefore, it must be
extended along its three underlying dimensions—state intervention in the global-
ization process, conditions of embedded autonomy, and threats to state interven-
tion that emerge dynamically during the development process—to develop a con-
ception of a “remade” FDS.
Table 1 outlines the differences between BDSs and FDSs along each of these
three dimensions. First, BDS theorists analyze state intervention in the economy
largely as a process of the creation of new domestic capabilities that can then be
brought to bear in global markets. The global economy is theorized largely as a
context in which states and national capitals can compete. However, under the
globalization project, transnational firms, networks and flows of money, informa-
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tion, and resources have deeply penetrated the most successful localities and
nations. Therefore, the role of the state is increasingly to mediate between the
global and the local, to connect them, and to shape the nature of the relationship
between them. The state may also be involved in creating the very actors that it
hopes will participate in these global-local connections and the development proj-
ect more generally. While the BDS also promoted the creation of economic
actors, it focused on hierarchical business groups as “national champions” instead
of transnationally integrated local networks.35 This is the first extension of BDS
theory—the understanding of the role of the developmental state as mediating
local and global connections.
The FDS is defined precisely by its ability to create and animate post-Fordist
networks of production and innovation and international networks of capital, and
to link them together in ways that promote local and national development. The
FDS can attempt to do this in two primary ways. It can connect to existing flows of
capital by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and then building local net-
works of production (typically subsupply) and innovation (much more rarely)
around this “imported” industrial organization. It can also attempt to foster indig-
enous networks of innovation and then encourage them to internationalize, but
from a position of relative strength. In either case, the state development strategy
is to connect the local to the global economy in such a way that local industrial
transformation, accumulation, and development can take place. The FDS plays a
key role in fostering “better” connections to the global.
The Irish state, in fact, played a critical role in “scaling up” social networks
within local technical communities into an innovative and growing industry.
These efforts were organized largely through a variety of industrial development
agencies that promoted an indigenous development alternative to reliance on for-
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Table 1
Bureaucratic and Flexible Developmental States
Bureaucratic Developmental State Flexible Developmental State
Shaping globalization Managing dependency Mediating global connections
– Strategic use of protectionism – Building local networks
around global capital
– Industrial subsidies – Taking local innovation
networks global
– Domestic banking system
Sources of embedded Coherence of state bureaucracy Flexibility of state structure
autonomy
Embedded in Embedded in
– Domestic capital – Professional labor
– Foreign capital
Threat to sustainability Internationalization of capital Internationalization of society
Rigidity of state bureaucracy Fragmentation of state
eign investment. The role of the state went well beyond merely gathering infor-
mation and upgrading infrastructure. The state agencies were the major providers
of funding to the industry until 1998 when venture capital flooded the industry.
However, agencies also used their connections to firms, established through this
funding role, to become educators and guides of the industry. By linking grants to
product exporting, R&D, management development, and so on, the state agencies
helped to define the nature of the software industry in Ireland and provided a con-
stant pressure on firms to upgrade their capabilities while also directing them to
the resources that could make this possible. The agencies networked firms
together through these contacts and were instrumental in the formation of a dense
network of industry associations, innovation centers, technology programs, and
other forums that promoted social networking within the industry. Negotiating
with lead firms about specific strategies, as in the East Asian BDSs, is not feasible
in decentralized industries such as software. The Irish FDS therefore concentrated
its efforts on shaping the organizational culture and capacities of firms by chan-
neling support to the industry through schemes that emphasized training, R&D,
and so on. The goal of state action was to shape the character and development
path of the industry rather than to influence specific business or technology
decisions.
Second, these multiple connections to local and global suggest that the social
and institutional foundations of the FDS are quite different from those of the BDS.
Evans analyzes state-society relations almost exclusively in terms of the relations
between key state bureaucrats and domestic entrepreneurs and executives.
However, the state may be embedded in numerous other social groups and be
formed by its multiple “embedded autonomies.” The FDS is based on a double
embeddedness in foreign capital and local, particularly professional, networks of
innovation.
The organizational structure of the FDS consists of a range of embedded
autonomies of the state, linking specific agencies with particular organizational
cultures and capacities to particular social groups. In Ireland, for example, Indus-
trial Development Agency (IDA) Ireland is the agency with the closest ties to for-
eign capital, Enterprise Ireland has a diverse set of connections to indigenous net-
works of innovation, and general issues of policy and coordination are dealt with
by an umbrella body, Forfás. The Departments of Enterprise, Trade and Employ-
ment and of the Taoiseach36 have close ties to national employer and labor organi-
zations. The agencies have significant internal flexibility in their dealings with
their constituencies. The state structure is also characterized by a high degree of
flexibility in the relation between the units of the state apparatus diffusing the sig-
nificant conflict that remains. Furthermore, each agency is connected in different
ways to different parts of the European Union (EU) political apparatus. Rather
than a cohesive and relatively insulated national state apparatus, the FDS consists
of a state apparatus that is deeply embedded in a “network polity,” forging
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sociopolitical alliances out of constantly shifting local, national, and global com-
ponents.37 In transforming itself to operate within a locally and globally net-
worked economy and polity, state governance itself is “rescaled” as the prior priv-
ileged role of the national level gives way to a “glocal” form of state.38
Furthermore, coherent state bureaucracies may not be the only organizational
structures that may promote embedded autonomy. Embedded autonomy in the
FDS is not guaranteed by a coherent bureaucracy but by the flexibility of the state
structure. Whereas the BDS has a “tightly coupled” organizational structure, the
FDS is built around a “loosely coupled” organizational model.39 The decentraliza-
tion of state agencies enables them to become deeply embedded in their cli-
ents/constituencies, even though they are often dealing with a wide range of indi-
viduals and organizations across widely dispersed networks. The agencies also
retain a certain autonomy despite their close relations to their constituencies as
there tends to be a relatively regular change in the goals, composition, and even
existence of the agencies as development needs change. The agencies are made
accountable by the setting of performance requirements and constant informal
monitoring by their social constituencies and by formal evaluations from within
the state bureaucracy.40 With a decentralized, flexible structure, change in any one
part of the state apparatus is much easier to carry out than in a more highly inte-
grated bureaucratic structure. Of course, these sources of embedded autonomy
may be combined with more classic Weberian bureaucratic conditions, as these
agencies’ locations within the state give them an essential degree of legitimacy
and cohesiveness. They remain potentially accountable to national goals, and
bureaucratic norms and processes continue to provide valuable standards of
accountability and professionalism.
Does the FDS therefore present a solution to the dilemmas of developmental
states in an era of globalization, the third dimension of the theory of the develop-
mental state? Unfortunately, there are no such “easy” answers, as the FDS is itself
threatened by its own limitations. The FDS’s strength is its ability to connect net-
worked and fragmented labor to networks of international capital. However, this
internationalization of capital does not seem to undermine local accumulation as
territorialized innovation and production networks form a transnational circuit of
autocentric development.41 Nonetheless, this process does result in a very uneven
internationalization of society, as some sections of labor connect to the global
directly while others are left largely servicing these groups’ local needs. Spiraling
national and international inequality, even as local accumulation proceeds apace,
becomes the dilemma of the FDS development model. This, in turn, creates politi-
cal dilemmas for the FDS as the flexibility that enables the state to connect local
and global in a variety of ways becomes a liability. The flip side of this flexibility
is the fragmentation of the state, making it all the more difficult for the state to
sustain a national development coalition around these uneven and unequal
local-global connections.
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IRISH SOFTWARE AND THE FDS
This theory of the FDS is part of a broader effort to theorize a global networked
economy and polity, an effort that has spread across the social sciences. It attempts
to locate state development strategies within a new international order, one that is
dominated by a neoliberal globalization project but still contains the economic
and political space in which to create development strategies out of combinations
of the local, national, and global. The rest of this article applies this theoretical
framework to an understanding of the development of the software industry in the
Republic of Ireland, using the case study to demonstrate the viability (and the lim-
its) of such a strategy. The next section describes the two globalizations of the
Irish software industry. The following three sections deal with each dimension of
the flexible state in turn—how the state shaped the globalization of Irish software,
the institutional foundations of this effort, and the threats and dilemmas that
emerge as part of this ongoing process. At the end of the article, I turn briefly to
questions of this model’s sustainability and generalizability.
The Two Globalizations of the Irish Software Industry
The two dominant, and distinct, modes of integration of the Irish software
industry into the global economy reflect the broader structure of Irish industry.
The first of these “globalizations” is dominated by foreign TNCs and their suppli-
ers, who carry out relatively low-level functions within their operations and have
relatively few links to the local economy. This foreign investment is, however, sig-
nificantly more embedded in the local economy than electronics investment has
been historically.42 The second globalization is that of indigenous software firms
that are increasingly active in selling into global markets and in developing alli-
ances with international IT firms. Many of these firms carry out sophisticated
development of software products for export.
Table 2 shows that the industry is divided relatively equally in employment
terms between foreign and Irish-owned firms. The foreign and indigenous firms
correspond for the most part to the two globalizations of Irish software. The reve-
nues (and exports) of the foreign-owned firms are much higher than those of the
Irish firms. However, the revenue figures for the foreign-owned sector are inflated
due to the presence of high-visibility packaged software firms such as Microsoft,
Novell, Symantec, and so on who carry out a great deal of disk duplication, pack-
aging, and software localization43 work in Ireland, mainly for the European mar-
ket. These companies generate huge sales from their Irish operations but rela-
tively little value is added in the Irish operation, as most of the core software
development takes place at the U.S. headquarters.
The TNC-led sector of the Irish industry is almost completely export oriented
with 93 percent of revenues in 1998 coming from exports. It is a particularly
important node in U.S. software companies’ global operations, which have been
expanding rapidly. Although official statistical sources are not strictly compara-
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ble, a conservative estimate would suggest that the exports of U.S. software firms
from Ireland come to at least half of their exports from the United States and may
be as high as three-quarters of the U.S. figure.44 These proportions would be even
higher were we to consider only exports into Europe. Microsoft and Lotus set
up software manufacturing operations in Dublin in 1985, and IDA Ireland—
the agency charged with attracting foreign investment—claims to have secured
40 percent of all the mobile U.S. electronics’ inward investment in Europe since
1988. Ireland therefore represents a critical node in the operations of the leading
U.S. software firms. The presence of large numbers of prominent foreign-owned
software companies in Ireland may, however, distract attention from the indige-
nous industry that has emerged as one of the most promising software industries
among newly industrializing countries, comparing favorably with other emerging
software industries such as India and Israel.45
There are clear differences between Irish and TNC companies.46 The TNCs are
significantly more likely to be involved in the “low-end” activities of localization,
porting, assembly/packaging, and logistics/distribution (and testing to a lesser
extent). Irish firms have a more well-rounded business model and are significantly
more likely to be involved in technical support and business solutions consulting,
alongside a full set of software development and test functions. Irish companies
are much less likely to be involved in the more mundane localization and test
work, are marginally more likely to be involved in development and research (and
interviews suggest that the difference is larger than survey results reveal), and are
much more likely to have technical support and business solutions operations. In
short, Irish companies tend to have a more fully developed software development
business model, while the TNC firms show greater specialization in the lower end
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Table 2
Number of Companies, Employment, and Revenues of Foreign and Irish Ownership
in the Irish Software Industry, 1987-97
Foreign Owned Irish Owned
Revenue Revenue
Year Firms Employment ($ m.) Firms Employment ($ m.)
(percentage growth in previous two years)
1987 25 600 NA 140 1,230 65
1991 74 3,992 2,465 291 3,801 234
1993 81 4,448 2,739 336 4,495 368
(9%) (11%) (11%) (15%) (18%) (57%)
1995 93 6,011 4,125 390 5,773 610
(15%) (35%) (51%) (16%) (28%) (66%)
1997 108 9,100 6,214 571 9,200 834
(16%) (51%) (51%) (46%) (59%) (37%)
Source: National Software Directorate, 1995 Software Industry Survey Results (Dublin: Forbairt,
1995); National Software Directorate, 1997 Software Industry Survey Results (Dublin: Forbairt,
1997); An Córas Tráchtála, The Irish Software Industry (Dublin: An Córas Tráchtála, 1987).
of the software development life cycle—although there are also a number of
TNCs carrying out relatively sophisticated work.
The TNCs largely carry out lower-level tasks, while the main development
tasks remain in the company’s home country, despite some upgrading in the activ-
ities of foreign companies. The Irish companies, although small, generally com-
pete in technically sophisticated global niche markets and are increasingly inte-
grated into international technology and business networks. Nonetheless, even
though 11 percent of their workforce in 1995 was overseas,47 the core corporate
and development functions of most indigenous firms remain in Ireland. The indig-
enous industry, in fact, consists of a large network of smaller firms (less than
twenty employees) and a number of star performers that have developed signifi-
cant strengths in international markets. Companies such as Iona Technologies,
Trintech, Baltimore, and CBT Systems have become important international fig-
ures in their particular areas of specialization.
However, internal firm capabilities and strategies are only part of the story, as
many firms marshal such skills and resources outside of the company. These
interfirm networks are an increasingly important part of global commodity chains
and production networks.48 Most companies have some alliance with other
firms—only 14.1 percent of Irish firms and 17.2 percent of TNCs have no alli-
ances at all. TNCs, however, are very weakly networked with other firms in Ire-
land, both with other TNCs and with Irish firms. Their local networks are largely
centered on contracting labor from Irish companies to provide them with flexibil-
ity in their staffing and their relatively extensive contracting with both Irish and
TNC companies for localization, manufacturing, and distribution services. Based
almost totally on the demand of the software TNCs, printing companies invested
heavily in new technology and the industry grew from $9 million to $135 million
in five years, while turnkey services grew from $0 to $150 million in the same
period.49 However, apart from these low-end activities, there is little connection
between the Irish and TNC sector, as 82 percent of Irish software companies and
75 percent of software TNCs have no alliance of any kind with other TNCs in
Ireland.
There are significant levels of contracting of labor and programming services
among indigenous firms themselves. However, there is also cooperation in more
advanced relationships such as codevelopment and sharing of technology and
comarketing and joint ventures. This dimension of local networking distinguishes
the Irish firms from the TNCs. Irish firms rely on international networks more
than local alliances in these “advanced” business and technical areas (especially
in developing technology and comarketing), while, as Table 3 shows, local net-
works are more important for labor and services contracting. Table 3 actually
understates the extent of the difference between TNCs and indigenous firms, as
breaking down these categories by individual types of networks shows that
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indigenous firms tend to have much more dense and diverse networks with
other firms.
These interfirm networks are complemented by employee networks, as techni-
cal professionals have tended to form close personal ties with others throughout
the industry. As one project manager put it,
It’s a very small community, everybody knows everybody. There is a constant flow of peo-
ple, they bring their experience with them. The Irish network is very strong in software. My
wife is German, she can’t believe it, she says, “It’s the original Internet!”. I eat lunch more
with people from different companies than from this one, I keep up with friends in the
industry.
This informal communication, structured by customers/users and technologies, is
part of the taken-for-granted structure of everyday life in the industry.
This technical community has relatively clear limits, as software firms and
employees have a tangential relationship to the national wage agreements that
have been centrally negotiated since 1987. The sector itself is almost completely
nonunion and the employment relations of technical workers were rarely directly
affected by the agreements. However, industries such as software benefited indi-
rectly from the national social-partnership agreements. The recovery in the public
finances allowed an increase in the funds made available for educational and tele-
communications investment, industrial policy, and the software sector specifi-
cally. A stable macroeconomic and financial regime also helped attract foreign
investment. This relationship to the national wage agreements is true of many of
the expanding, globalized sectors that contain large numbers of professional
employees and nonunion firms.50
To provide an understanding of the dynamics, institutional conditions, and
contradictions of the Irish software industry’s development, the next three sec-
tions apply each dimension of the FDS theory to the history of the industry.
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Table 3
Percentage of Companies Having Any Alliance with Other Companies in Each of
Four Broad Categories
Percentage of Firms Having an
Alliance in This Category
Irish Companies TNC Companies
Technology/business alliances with Irish firms 39 13
Technology/business alliances with international firms 47 59
Contracting alliances with Irish firms 51 34
Contracting alliances with international firms 35 36
Note: TNC = transnational corporation.
States and Globalizations
Protectionist measures were eased after the 1950s for foreign investors in the
Republic of Ireland and were removed entirely in 1964. The state became the key
actor in attracting foreign investment, and attracting mobile investment became a
dominant policy goal for the following forty years. Among the critical elements of
Ireland’s locational advantage were very generous tax incentives and grants, as
well as a transnational-friendly environment including no restrictions on the repa-
triation of profits. After providing a low- or no-tax environment since the 1950s, a
new policy in 1978 provided 10 percent corporation tax for all manufacturing
from 1981 to 2000 inclusive. This was extended to firms in the internationally
traded services sector (including software and data processing) in 1981 and guar-
anteed until 2010 the same year. Recently a 12.5 percent corporate tax rate has
been guaranteed until 2025.
In later years, a world-class telecommunications system and, in particular, a
young and cooperative labor force have arguably been as or more important.
However, the state’s greatest efforts were dedicated to the mobilization and
restructuring of local society through the creation and shaping of a “suitable”
labor force. A state-led reorientation of the education system toward technical
education was reinforced over time by the increasing influence of the new col-
leges focused on technology, whose success put pressure on the existing universi-
ties to change their orientation to technical and scientific education and to foster-
ing links with industry.51
The state was placed at center stage in industrial policy by its efforts to continu-
ally upgrade these “factors of production.” It took on the role of “midwife” to for-
eign investment.52 These policy and institutional changes had the desired effect of
attracting extensive amounts of foreign investment, including such software
firms as Microsoft, Lotus, Novell, and Corel. There has been some local embed-
ding of these firms in a territorial complex around the Dublin region based on a
subsupplier base in turnkey services and software manual printing.
The state has played a central role in supporting the growth of these
subsupplier industries, particularly by providing finance and advice to the entre-
preneurs in these newly minted sectors and by coordinating relations among
Irish-born managers of TNCs and these emerging firms. Printing firms, for exam-
ple, received significant funding from the IDA for the expensive new Web print
technologies required for software manual printing.53
Furthermore, the IDA began to target hardware companies in the early 1980s,
encouraging them to expand their software operations. Some TNC subsidiaries
have been able to develop such operations. This is particularly the case in more
general IT and telecommunications companies such as Digital, Amdahl, IBM,
Siemens Nixdorf, Phillips, Ericsson, or ATT/Lucent Technologies. As the man-
ager of one of these operations said, “We have got more than the Microsoft and
Lotus subsidiaries. The diversity of our parent company helps us a lot in that.”
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Many policymakers did indeed hope that the TNCs attracted to Ireland would
in time spin off a range of Irish-owned firms. This has happened to a limited extent
in the software industry, although it provides only one piece of the puzzle of the
industry’s growth. One-third of the respondents in a study of thirty-six indigenous
software entrepreneurs had worked in a TNC directly before starting their own
company—either in TNCs in the IT sector or in the IT sections of TNCs in other
sectors. Two-thirds of indigenous entrepreneurs had worked for a TNC in Ireland
at some stage of their careers, half had worked abroad in software or a related sec-
tor, and half had worked in a sector that was now a customer of their firm.54 Direct
spin-offs of software firms from software TNCs are relatively rare, however.
While this international and customer experience might be expected given the
dominance of TNCs in the Irish economy and the mass emigration of the 1980s, it
has been a valuable source of experience for many technical entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, these figures alone cannot explain why these individuals did
indeed ultimately leave the TNCs and start out on the path of indigenous entrepre-
neurship rather than taking the more common routes until the early 1990s of emi-
gration or long-term TNC employment. Return emigration did not become a sig-
nificant factor until after the growth dynamic of Irish software was well under
way, although it was clearly important in sustaining that growth. Nor can it
explain the internal growth dynamic of the indigenous industry—the most signifi-
cant part of the indigenous story. The same study showed that another third or so
had come directly from indigenous software firms, while the final third had come
from indigenous firms in other sectors, most notably software distribution and
computer hardware. Therefore, the dynamic of generating new companies is
strongest in the indigenous sector and especially within the software industry
itself.
So how did the indigenous software industry emerge from the vicious circle of
TNC dependence and professional emigration? The state, through its heavy
investment in education, had created a new class basis for an indigenous techno-
logy promotion and business expansion agenda. The danger here was, of course, a
massive brain drain that did indeed take place. However, of those who stayed, a
number started their own companies and combined with a trickle of people from
the foreign-owned sector and from user organizations to form a constituency that
could support state agencies promoting indigenous development. What did the
state agencies do to support the development of this new constituency?
The first element of the agencies’approach was to define the orientation of the
Irish software industry. In its strategic review of 1992, the National Software
Directorate (NSD) identified software products clearly as the major focus of the
Irish industry, making official what had been the attitude of the state agencies for
some time.55 Furthermore, the NSD identified the need of software product firms
to export early in their development, due to the small size of the Irish domestic
market, as a critically important issue for the Irish industry. The state agencies
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focused then on encouraging firms with software products for export, being much
more receptive to such firms in their grant applications and designing some state
supports (especially in the area of marketing) so that they were oriented mainly to
the problems of product exporting.
Industrial policy also began to shift through the 1980s toward a greater focus
on indigenous industry and a greater selectivity in grant giving.56 However, the
state agencies ultimately focused not only on “picking winners,” which they did to
some extent, but also on a more generalized strategy of “making winners” out of
the many firms they dealt with by upgrading the capabilities of the industry as a
whole. Total grant payments by state agencies to indigenous software companies
increased from IR£ 3 to 3½ million per annum between 1988 and 1990, up to 5.4
million in 1991, and 5.66 million in 1992.57 Forbairt, the primary agency dealing
with indigenous firms at the time, also became more demanding of the indigenous
companies presenting proposals to them. As one Irish emigrant stockbroker in
Silicon Valley put it to me: “I think Forbairt have been great. There’s a lot of
money for companies, but you have to be good; you almost have to be selling in
Britain or Europe before you get the grants. Forbairt are very tough.” This level of
financing of the indigenous software industry was very significant in the context
of a severe shortage of other capital sources for the industry. In fact, much of the
early venture capital that did become available to the industry was induced into
the industry by state actions.
Forbairt, now part of Enterprise Ireland, ties the finance it provides to firms to
various aspects of company development—in particular, R&D, marketing, and
management development. A striking aspect of R&D funding is the critical
importance of state and EU funding in the earlier period—accounting for almost
30 percent of funding directly and, since many of these funds were provided on a
matching-funds basis, for around half of all R&D funding in the indigenous soft-
ware companies in 1993. These governmental policies, therefore, were critical in
stimulating R&D in the earlier stages of the industry’s development. An executive
in Forbairt working closely with software companies told me that Forbairt
attempts to provide for each stage of the development of a company—feasibility
grants as seed capital for start-ups, employment grants for the early growth phase,
and then funding for R&D, training, and management development for the com-
pany development phase.
The impact of this approach on firms seems to have been positive. While many
firms complain about the administrative demands of filling out grant applications,
analysis of grant-aided and non-grant-aided firms shows that through the early
1990s, at least grant-aided firms significantly outperformed non-grant-aided
firms—both in the software industry and in the economy as a whole.58 Further-
more, many firms themselves say that they have found state support helpful,
which is impressive given many managers’skepticism of state action.59 Therefore,
the agencies are clearly taking a self-consciously developmental approach to
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companies as well as to the industry as a whole, even though this approach is often
couched in the more neoliberal language of enterprise.60
The Irish development agencies learned how to upgrade the capabilities of
firms within a decentralized industry, a skill quite different from those of the BDS
bureaucrats. However, they also went beyond this role and played a significant
part in fostering and developing the social networks and associational life under-
pinning innovation in the industry. They have instituted “softer” supports such as
the mentoring scheme, where small companies are put in touch with experienced
industry figures who for a relatively small sum become a “guide, philosopher, and
friend” to the company, sometimes ultimately becoming company directors. The
agencies also used the grant-aid process as an opportunity to informally stimulate
connections among firms within the industry, drawing on their detailed knowl-
edge of other firms accumulated through the grant-aid process. The same Forbairt
executive mentioned above argued that
the development agencies learned that the lone ranger approach doesn’t work. A com-
pany needs partners, the mentoring program helped with that. The agencies also played
an informal role in introducing people. That’s something we would have pushed, the part-
nerships. The other thing the agencies pushed was the capital issue, Forbairt has been
priming venture capital funds. . . . Our role is not picking winners but “helping to make
winners.” It’s too difficult to predict winners to pick them, otherwise we wouldn’t need to
be working! A lot of our discussions with companies are not regarding the money but
regarding business issues. . . . There is a lot of company capability development work; we
were less proactive than that in the days of COPS [an indigenous company that went bust
in 1990]. The agencies have gone from being funding agencies to doing company
development.
Furthermore, a network of industry and trade associations, universities, inno-
vation and technology centers, and other forums and groups have been created
that provide an associational infrastructure for information sharing, cooperation,
and innovation in Irish software. While these bodies are outside the state or
semiautonomous from it, in most cases they have been founded through state ini-
tiatives and underwritten by state guarantees and funding. Typically, they are
located in universities and have representatives from the state, business, and edu-
cation on their boards.
Some brief examples should illustrate the key role of these institutions. The
National Microelectronics Application Centre (MAC) was founded in the early
1980s and was charged with bringing electronics to Irish industry. Based in the
University of Limerick, it provides technical advice and houses up-to-date equip-
ment for industry use and is reported by interviewees to have had close relations
with many software firms. The director of MAC told me the following:
Our core skill is the development cycle, rather than any particular technical area. We spend
a lot of time talking with entrepreneurs—90 percent may decide that their idea is not on,
usually because the idea is out there already or they are too soon or too late vis-à-vis the
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technology curve. We get a lot of business from the remaining 10 percent. Typically, the
people we are dealing with, it’s their first time through the cycle, they get upset at any
shocks.
The critical point here is that there is an educational return to the industry in terms
of the 90 percent who do not pursue a doomed project, even though MAC does not
receive any payment from these companies. Indeed, the primary role of MAC is a
more specialized educational contribution than the development agencies can
provide:
We can lay out the potential of smart products for the entrepreneurs. We’ve helped in that
regard, we have an education role, we can guide entrepreneurs, we push them on first-class
global standards, let them know what is expected.
In the late 1980s, the Programme in Advanced Technologies (PAT) was estab-
lished, including software. The software PAT consisted of three centers initially.
Perhaps the center with the most impact on the software industry itself has been
the Centre for Software Engineering (CSE), located at Dublin City University.
Although the initial PAT proposal called for a certain amount of research within
the PATs, the CSE’s role has been mainly promotional and informational. In par-
ticular, it has promoted quality in software production and the ISO 9000 quality
standard and has had a major impact on the software industry through its courses
and various forms of information dissemination.61 In this it was no doubt helped
by its good relationship with Dublin City University, where it is located and where
it had actually been founded in 1989 before being brought into the software PAT in
1990. Furthermore, there are close relations with industry as the CSE board spans
academia, industry, and state agencies. The other two PAT centers—Multimedia
Technologies Ireland and the National Institute for Management Technology—
ran into more difficulties. Both of these centers were more focused on smaller
constituencies, the small multimedia industry, and executives in business outside
of high tech, respectively, and this made their relation to the software PAT some-
what problematic. Within these constituencies, however, they were reasonably
well evaluated.62 In general, in fact, most of the PAT schemes have received favor-
able evaluations, no matter what sector they are in. Nonetheless, both of these cen-
ters were closed or sold in a reorganization of the PAT scheme in 1997.
The state has also been instrumental in establishing industry associations. One
such innovation center and industry association is the Localization Resources
Centre (LRC), established at University College Dublin (UCD) under the technol-
ogy centers scheme. The LRC promotes quality and resource sharing in the local-
ization sector of the software industry and has been instrumental in setting up the
successful industry forum, the Software Localization Interest Group (SLIG). This
is not the only industry association set up by a state agency—the Multimedia
Technology Institute (MTI) helped to start the Irish Interactive Multimedia Asso-
ciation, which persists after the demise of MTI, while the NSD has a close rela-
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tionship with the Irish Software Association (although that body has been in exis-
tence since the 1970s).
Another agency funded by the EU but playing a somewhat different role is the
NSD. The NSD was established within the IDA, although it moved to become part
of Forbairt when the agencies were reorganized in 1994. Its role, while somewhat
unclear at first, has evolved so that it has become a central focal point within the
state agencies for dealings with software. Although the everyday work of grant
assessment is carried out by the International Services Programme within
Forbairt, the NSD is represented on grant-giving committees. It also fulfills many
of the educational and networking roles discussed above in relation to the state
agencies. However, the NSD is primarily a strategic link between the industry and
the state development agencies. Furthermore, the NSD constantly monitors and
reviews the key issues for the software industry and the operation of the institu-
tions and infrastructure supporting the industry. It has been a prime mover in refo-
cusing the activities of the PATs and in the debates over a growing pressure on
skills and the issue of access to capital.
There is therefore a network of institutions providing technical and business
information of various kinds and degrees of specialization to different sectors
within the software industry. These institutions provide a way in which the state
can provide an everyday impetus toward world-class technical, business, and
quality standards without involving itself directly in regulating the firms—a mea-
sure that would be deeply unpopular. The staff of these centers become the every-
day teachers and advisers of the industry. However, they also gather a great deal of
up-to-the-minute information from the industry and can be a valuable source of
information for the central state agencies when they need to make rapid shifts or
adjustments in policy. They are largely staffed by people with backgrounds in
industry themselves who sometimes maintain that involvement on a part-time
basis.63
Various state agencies have played critical roles in developing the Irish soft-
ware industry. IDA Ireland has been very effective in attracting foreign investment
and somewhat successful in promoting the upgrading of TNC activities and devel-
opment of subsuppliers. Other state agencies have played key roles in developing
a high value-added indigenous software sector. In particular, state actions have
been able to steer Irish technical professionals away from the temptations of TNC
employment or emigration and into the perils, and potentially lucrative rewards,
of small-firm entrepreneurship. The state has also been able to shape the capaci-
ties and culture of the industry through its emphasis on promoting innovation,
business development, and networking across the industry.
The two modes of integration into the global economy of the Irish software
industry are only tangentially linked to one another. However, the state has been
critical to the emergence of each globalization of Irish software. How was it possi-
ble for the state to play this role for each of these globalizations, and how has it
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been possible for them to be pursued simultaneously without one overwhelming
the other? Here we turn to our understanding of the multiple embedded autono-
mies within the Irish state and the flexible organizational structure that reconciles
them within the state itself.
Embedded Autonomy through Flexibility
The state agency most closely linked to TNCs is the IDA, restructured as IDA
Ireland since 1994. The IDA was founded in 1949, took on a more central role in
attracting foreign investment in the early 1960s, and by the late 1960s had become
the central agency in formulating and implementing industrial policy.
It has developed close ties with many TNCs—abroad and in Ireland. These ties
are first formed through the IDA’s international offices. The project officers in
these four European, six U.S., and five Asia-Pacific offices establish an early rela-
tionship with many companies in their area and ultimately hand the companies off
to their counterparts in Ireland. The IDA also plays a critical role in providing
for these firms’ needs once they are established in Ireland, providing a “one-stop
shop” of sorts for them within the Irish political economy. As one longtime TNC
manager said, “We’re a little cut off out here but we have a good relationship with
the IDA officers. I can always ring Kieran [McGowan—then CEO of IDA Ireland]
anyway.” These close ties to local managers of TNCs are important to what efforts
are made to pressure the TNC subsidiaries to continue to make efforts to upgrade
their operations. Often these local and international ties are combined to good
effect. For example, ties to a TNC head office might be useful in developing a
closer relationship between an Irish supplier firm and the parent firm in the United
States—as one IDA officer told me: “Sometimes we have to use our contact with
the U.S. to get around the local TNC manager who’s trying to get all the credit for
himself and won’t tell head office about this supplier in Ireland.”
The IDA is a quasi-independent state agency, although it receives its funding
from, and must report to, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
and the cabinet minister in that department. In 1969, the IDA became an agency
outside of the civil service structure and it has become increasingly independent,
until recent years, of the rest of the state economic development regime. Until the
early 1990s, most of the initiatives in industrial policy were developed through the
IDA. Although its board membership changes, its executive leadership has been
very stable and the IDA has developed a strong corporate identity of its own. Its
place outside the conventional civil service gives it a flexibility in internal organi-
zation and a freedom of maneuvering that is unusual for state agencies. With
strong internal promotion patterns and little mobility out of the IDA, it forms a
very cohesive unit within the Irish state with a strong focus on its given objectives
of attracting FDI. It has also been able to build up significant skills internally in
terms of knowledge of international markets and the politics and economics of
industrial location. The IDA is embedded in the TNCs and autonomous from the
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rest of the state, indicating the difficulties of attempting to shape the actions of
TNCs.
The embedded autonomy of the state agencies promoting the indigenous
industry is quite different, and these agencies have always had a difficult relation-
ship with the IDA and its dominant position within the state. The IDA’s autonomy
within the Irish state institutionalized an industrial policy focus on attracting for-
eign investment. Such institutionalization appears to be a crucial element of the
effectiveness in the medium to long term of any policy agenda, as it allows the
accumulation of resources, skills, and political legitimacy and alliances. How-
ever, this also means that an existing agenda is likely to “crowd out” other agen-
das, unless they themselves can create “safe” institutional spaces where they can
avoid an attack from the existing regime. Such spaces did not emerge for the pro-
motion of indigenous industry until the 1980s.
Nonetheless, there had always been elements within the Irish state that had
concerned themselves with indigenous development. Within the IDA itself, pro-
grams were pursued in the 1970s relating to indigenous industry, although attract-
ing FDI dominated the organizational objectives, culture, and skills of the IDA.
There were, however, a series of other state bodies that carved out some space
around the agenda of promoting science, technology, and innovation and that
were largely oriented toward indigenous industry. These state institutions relied
heavily on EU funds for their activities, and many of their programs were funded
in large part by European Structural Funds. These funds were designated for Ire-
land as part of an effort to develop the peripheral regions of the EU in the face of
the upcoming Single European Market in 1992. Many commentators have attrib-
uted Ireland’s growth to this influx of EU capital. However, the significance of the
Structural Funds was that they were the means by which a variety of new, some-
times experimental, measures could be taken without having to fight the rest of the
state agencies for funding. The new development regime could develop alongside
the old and did not have to challenge the old development model directly for funds
and priority, except in rare cases. Such are the opportunities within a “networked
polity”64 for local and national and transnational actors for forging new coalitions
that bypass existing national power structures—even, as in cases such as this,
where the ultimate goal is national economic transformation.
Agencies such as the National Board for Science and Technology (NBST) and
the NSD were embedded in the emerging technical professional class through
personal and associational networks. Key individuals pursued careers that
spanned private, public, and semipublic organizations, making the boundaries
between these different spheres porous and fostering increased interaction across
those organizational boundaries. This, in turn, improved the agencies’capacity to
make and implement effective policy. The first director of the NSD,65 Barry
Murphy, had been the managing director of Insight Software—an Irish company
sold to Hoskyns from the United Kingdom in 1988. Director of the NSD until
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1996, he moved on to work with the Cullinane Group Ireland (CGI), an organiza-
tion founded by U.S. software industry veteran John Cullinane to invest in Irish
software companies but that also carries out research on the software industry and
boosts Irish high-tech. Murphy was also involved in writing the strategy docu-
ment published by the Irish Software Association in March 1998. The second
director of NSD, Jennifer Condon, came from the industry to work on the market-
ing side of the National Software Centre (a state-sponsored center supporting
industry development and carrying out research) in the mid-1980s. She was then
managing director of ICL’s IT Centre in Dublin from 1988 until 1996, when she
joined the NSD.
The post of director of the NSD is itself a temporary one that ensures that the
director ultimately returns to the industry in some guise. The staff of the NSD con-
sist of the director and three other staff members—two of whom are from within
the state development agencies and a third with a background in the industry. This
also ensures a combination of embeddedness in the industry and a certain auton-
omy of focus and objectives. There also is a group of prominent software manag-
ers who have been involved in policy initiatives within the industry, either through
the industry trade association, the Irish Software Association, or as participants in
policy consultation groups such as the Software Industry Working Group in 1989
or the Software Consultative Committee at the present time. Furthermore, there is
a significant overlap with the educational sector, as prominent computer science
and engineering academics have liaised closely with industry and the state in a
variety of forums.
Autonomy from their business constituency is maintained by the performance
requirements placed on the various agencies, centers, and programs. These
requirements are given a cutting edge by the regular evaluation of programs—and
publication of those evaluations.66 Furthermore, poor evaluations can result in
closure, sale, or reorganization of such programs. For example, as part of this pro-
cess of constant shifting and experimentation with state and semistate agencies,
the National Institute of Management Technology was sold, MTI restructured,
and the Centre for Software Engineering given new responsibilities. This can
occur at the level of reorganization of the agencies themselves. These included the
National Science Council, founded in the late 1960s, and its successor, the NBST
founded in 1977. In the mid-1980s, science and technology policies were reorga-
nized significantly with a new Office of Science and Technology being formed
under a minister of state (a junior cabinet minister) in what was then the Depart-
ment of Industry and Commerce. The NBST was merged with the Institute for
Industrial Research and Standards in 1987 to form Eolas, a new science and tech-
nology agency. Around the same time, various agencies were consolidated into
one agency to deal with active labor market policy (FÁS) and into another to deal
with export marketing (An Bord Tráchtála). In 1994, Forbairt, an agency focused
solely on indigenous industry, was created incorporating most of the staff and
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functions of Eolas and the Irish Industry section of the IDA. In 1998, An Bord
Tráchtála was merged into Forbairt, although under some protest from local
firms, which feared a loss of marketing assistance. Finally, these various agencies
were folded into Enterprise Ireland, which consolidated these agencies under one
institutional roof.
This experimentation can also operate within an existing agency that changes
its focus over time. Due to the requirements of the EU funders, centers such as
LRC, CSE, and NSD are subject to significant and detailed external evaluation.
They are also ultimately subject to the control of the state and will therefore also
reflect broad policy concerns. For example, the CSE has been setting targets for
the uptake of quality procedures within the industry as a whole. In 1997, the CSE,
at the request of the NSD, instigated programs aimed at diffusing quality proce-
dures into small software firms, based on its prior success at diffusing such proce-
dures among the larger firms.
This loosely coupled and flexible organizational structure has not emerged
without ongoing tensions. In particular, the IDA was peculiarly powerful within
the Irish state, and this helps to explain the weakness of the institutions supporting
indigenous industry until the late 1980s. It took the massive social and economic
crisis of the 1980s to delegitimate the IDA’s role as the sole bearer of the task of
Irish industrial transformation. It was into this restricted institutional space that
the alliance of Irish technical professionals and the previously marginalized “sci-
ence and technology” state agencies stepped to support indigenous industry, in the
process creating the delicate compromise at the heart of the FDS.
Inequality, Fragmentation, and Sustainability
Despite the relatively successful adaptation of state structures to the multiple
globalizations of Irish industry, and software in particular, this is not a story with-
out its own tensions and darker sides. These globalizations have occurred within
the context of a macroeconomic stabilization secured since 1987 by a national
neocorporatist “social partnership” compromise. Rising inequality has created
significant tensions between the institutionalized globalizations of software (and
similar industries) and the institutions of national neocorporatism.
Wage inequality has increased drastically in Ireland since the late 1980s, at
which point it was already one of the most unequal OECD nations in any case. The
major component of that increase in inequality has been a growing gap between
the middle and the top of the income distribution. While the average income of the
top 10 percent was 195 percent of the median income in 1987, by 1994, that per-
centage had grown to 224 percent. Although the supply of skilled labor has
increased rapidly, it has still been outstripped by demand, and increasing returns
to education account for a sizeable proportion of this growth in wage inequality.67
The Irish case is clearly an exception to the tendency internationally for
neocorporatism to lessen wage inequality. This is explained, as far as can be told
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from the incomplete evidence available, by precisely the multiple and fragmented
structure that is the flip side of the FDS. Neocorporatist wage bargaining in Ire-
land, particularly in the later agreements, contained provisions for special local
bargains that would exceed the terms of the national agreements. Furthermore,
there was widespread departure from the terms of the agreement in later years,
particularly in industries such as software that had difficulty holding on to labor
that had a variety of local and global opportunities. Evidence for 1991-97 shows
that in that period, 51 percent of respondents said that pay awards at their work-
place adhered to the terms of the national agreement, 44 percent said that awards
exceeded the agreement, and 5 percent said that awards were less than the terms of
the agreement.68
Looking at union versus nonunion workplaces, 70 per cent of union firms said their awards
did not differ from the national agreement while 25 per cent said they exceeded them. For
non-union firms however—which would include significant numbers of multinational
firms—fully 63 per cent said that their awards exceeded those nationally agreed. In addi-
tion, 39 per cent of firms stated that one reason for exceeding the terms of the national
agreement was to retain staff who were in short supply.69
The organization of the software workplace contributes to greater inequality at
the national level in a number of ways. The individualistic model of industrial
relations in software firms encourages such employee threats to “job-hop” as an
employee bargaining strategy, intensifying wage inflation. The long hours that are
typical and the pressure this places on the work/family nexus also contributes to
inequality by promoting the expansion of low-wage personal services.70 This
pressure is all the more relevant given the trend toward dual-earner families with
32 percent of couples being dual earners in 1996, up from 16 percent in 1986.71
There is also likely to be a link between the expansion noted earlier of professional
and of low-wage service occupations we noted earlier, as such services emerge in
large part to solve the work/family dilemmas of these expanding professional
classes. In 1994-95, 27.8 percent of household spending in the state on “services
and other expenses” was by the top income decile, and another 18.6 percent was
accounted for by the next decile—up from 27.0 percent and 17.9 percent, respec-
tively, in 1987. The top two deciles accounted for 55 percent of spending on non-
resident domestic service, 72 percent of spending on resident domestic service,
and 60 percent of spending on child care (including baby-sitting).72 As
dual-earner professional couples grow as a proportion of the workforce, and in the
absence of any meaningful policy efforts to better distribute work and family
responsibilities, they are likely to stimulate the growth of personal service occu-
pations alongside them. Although the fall in unemployment tends to reduce over-
all inequality, the polarization of occupational growth is contributing to rising
wage inequality among the employed.
High professional wages pose a political dilemma for the Irish model of devel-
opment. Unionized workers who have lived under wage restraint for thirteen years
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and have seen others outstrip them at an increasingly rapid rate are becoming less
and less willing to sacrifice their wages to keep inflation low for those accumulat-
ing high profits and high wages elsewhere in the economy.73 Each pay agreement
has been passed by a slimmer margin than the last, and there is a strong possibility
that the current agreement may not be renewed.
Conflicts are therefore increasingly likely to emerge between the multiple
globalizations of the Irish economy and the institutions and embedded autono-
mies of the state that have supported each of these globalizations during the past
decade(s). Such tensions are already emerging around issues such as employer
resistance to unionization, attempts to regulate the length of the workweek, public
sector pay restraint, the rights of part-time workers, and so on.74
The rejuvenation of the Irish economy since the 1980s has been achieved
through the uneasy coexistence of a number of institutional realms within the
state, constituting a variety of embedded autonomies of state action. A self-
confident professional class has emerged that is deeply integrated into local and
global technology and business networks and negotiates individual career paths
based on mobility through those networks. This class is increasingly divorced from
the institutions that have been a powerful force shaping national-level industrial
relations and wage bargaining since 1987—the unions and the organizations associ-
ated with neocorporatist social-partnership agreements.
There is therefore an increasing fragmentation within the national state, a frag-
mentation that is the dark side of the FDS. This model of development also turns
out to be Janus-faced. Its success, based on a profound internationalization of
social and economic life through flexible state institutions, turns out to be the
major threat to its sustainability as these multiple globalizations generate an
inequality and enormous political tensions that the decentralized state institutions
have great difficulty containing. This is perhaps most obvious in the increasingly
narrow margin within the unions themselves in favor of the national social-
partnership agreements, agreements that have secured the macroeconomic condi-
tions of industrial transformation.
THE POLITICS OF GLOBALIZATIONS
National economies are increasingly constituted out of three interacting but
empirically distinct modes of integration into the global economy. The first, and
most widely recognized, is built around attracting foreign investment and, to a
limited degree, embedding it in the local economy. The global goes local. The sec-
ond, and most surprising in the context of Irish economic history, is the emergence
of a local network of indigenous firms that have become increasingly integrated
into international business and technology flows and have been highly successful
in international markets. The local goes global. Third, a series of national
neocorporatist social partnership agreements since 1987 have created a stable
macroeconomic and financial environment that has underpinned industrial trans-
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formation, while mediating the relationship of unionized workers and welfare
recipients to the global economy. The national level mediates local adjustment to
the global. To conclude this analysis, I will briefly summarize how these
globalizations interact in the case of Irish software, give examples of other states
that balance these globalizations quite differently albeit within a FDS model, and
discuss the importance of the politics of transnational regulation in shaping these
different versions of the FDS model.
The software industry in Ireland represents one such set of interactions among
globalizations. Clearly, foreign investment is a central element of the industry and
of the Irish economy. However, we cannot reduce the emergence of indigenous
industry and of national social partnership to the dominance of the foreign invest-
ment-led policy. Nor can we ignore significant improvements in R&D, indige-
nous exports, technological and business upgrading, employment expansion, the
reversal of mass emigration, and occupational upgrading—alongside inequality
and social polarization. There is more to the Irish economy than a foreign
investment-led “bubble economy.”
Foreign investment itself is varied in its character and impact. While
Microsoft’s software duplication and localization operation has little impact
beyond a small number of subsupplier firms, other TNCs such as Digital and
Ericsson have had important training and spin-off effects. These firms in many
cases predate the arrival of Microsoft, Intel, and the other high-profile U.S. IT
firms in Ireland, and their contribution cannot be reduced to an artifact of “buy-
ing” Microsoft and Intel.
Neither can foreign investment flows explain the emergence of the export-
oriented indigenous firms that have clearly developed a significant base within the
Irish economy. Foreign investment cannot explain their existence, which suggests
that we must turn to a different set of factors—factors that I identify as a synergy
between particular science and technology–oriented state agencies and an emerg-
ing technical professional class. The state goes beyond merely upgrading infra-
structure and gathering information, moving well beyond the role of the World
Bank’s “good state.”75 We have seen that, using grants and a variety of other mech-
anisms, the Irish state has been able to play a “husbandry” role, pushing indige-
nous firms and even some TNC subsidiaries to pursue more developmentally
promising competitive strategies.
The institutions of neocorporatism also have a tangential relationship with
both of these globalizations of industry in Ireland, as most of the employees in the
high-technology sectors are not covered by these agreements in any significant
way. Indeed, labor costs are not a significant part of the cost calculus of the soft-
ware TNCs locating in Ireland, as shown by the continuing inflow of software
investment in the face of annual wage raises in recent years among software devel-
opers of 10 percent to 15 percent. The limits of national corporatism and its fail-
ures in relation to social welfare provision, social housing, and bridging local
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exclusion are also largely issues of domestic politics. There is therefore signifi-
cant room to maneuver within these models and in the space between them. Glob-
alization may be dominated by a neoliberal agenda, but significant room for polit-
ical action and national development strategies remain.
Questions remain as to the sustainability of the FDS model, but these questions
arise not so much from the extent of dependence on foreign investment as from the
tendency toward institutional and political fragmentation and the threat posed by
rising inequality to the FDS’s ability to sustain the sociopolitical compromises
underpinning Irish growth.76 Although the Irish economy may be more dependent
in terms of revenues on TNCs now than ten years ago (a dependence distorted by
TNC creative accounting), it has also fundamentally lessened that dependence by
creating an indigenous manufacturing and informational industry complex that is
not directly dependent on the TNCs. Furthermore, this indigenous base has very
deep roots in the local economy and society and has significantly upgraded its
technical and business capabilities. The real threat to sustainability, therefore, is
likely to be the lack of social solidarity reflected in, and exacerbated by, increasing
income inequality—not dependence on foreign capital. However, there are signif-
icant actions that can be taken at the national level to ameliorate this inequality—
precisely because foreign investment does not dominate the economy as totally as
O’Hearn suggests. The legitimate critique of the overreliance on foreign invest-
ment may, if taken too far, result in letting domestic elites off the hook. The ten-
dency of recent tax and other fiscal decisions to increase inequality has little or
nothing to do with the desire to attract further foreign investment.
Nor is the Republic of Ireland, nor its software industry, a unique case of the
FDS. The three modes of integration into the global economy identified as consti-
tutive of the FDS might be generalized in a comparative analysis. Chris Ansell
argues that the EU is characterized by two dominant regional development strat-
egies—competition for mobile investment and regional networking strategies.77
The literature on economic development is similarly split between an emphasis on
the dominance of global production and an attention to localized “industrial dis-
tricts.” Furthermore, the impact of established national models of the political
economy—for example, neoliberal, social democratic, socialist, and BDS institu-
tions—remains significant in mediating the incorporation of the local into the
global. It is the interaction of these three modes of management of the integration
of local and global that maps out the possibilities and limits of development strate-
gies in an era of globalization.
Some brief comparative examples can illustrate the generalizability and utility
of this framework. The Netherlands has been one of the most successful econo-
mies in Europe in the 1990s. Attracting a significant amount of foreign invest-
ment, it has nonetheless combined this with a strong regional growth dynamic in
the main metropolitan agglomeration, the Ranstad, and with a revitalization of
national corporatist institutions, driven by learning in policy networks.78 Interest-
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ingly, increases in wage inequality have been minimal in the Netherlands, which
suggests that there are likely to be more egalitarian, yet successful, globalizations
than those pursued by the Republic of Ireland. Within the EU, we are thus likely to
see varying efforts by national corporatist institutions to reconstruct national eco-
nomic and social development on Neil Brenner’s “glocalized” terrain.
The East Asian economies, despite the challenges to the BDS, are also pursu-
ing a variety of relatively successful strategies. Giovanni Arrighi argues that there
has been a shift within the region from a Japan-centered system toward a
reemergence of the Chinese merchant diaspora.79 Both China and Taiwan have
built successful development projects around the integration of these transna-
tional communities, and transnational investment, with local networks. In China’s
case, this has taken the form of a “local state corporatism,” where local states have
the autonomy to manage their economies, an autonomy that is politically possi-
ble, ironically, precisely because of the authority of the central state.80 In Taiwan,
the BDS has always presided over a more decentralized system than that of Korea
and Japan. Its integration with U.S. business networks and weaker reliance on
high-debt financing has enabled Taiwan to escape the worst of the Asian financial
crisis. Meanwhile, the state has encouraged the integration of transnational and
local networks in a way that promotes local innovation and accumulation.81
The concept of the FDS promises to be a useful one in analyzing such cases.
Neither should the Irish case be taken as the “purest” expression of the approach.
The development of IT in Israel and Taiwan, for example, seems to correspond to
the FDS model but with a much greater emphasis on indigenous firms, a more
selective attitude to foreign investment, and a greater capability to raise large
amounts of capital. The case of the Netherlands discussed earlier suggests that the
tensions around uneven internationalization and rising inequality can be managed
better than the Irish state has done. However, the character of state intervention
and its organizational and institutional underpinnings in each case remain close to
the FDS model. From this perspective, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the
Irish case in terms of policy lessons is the conditions under which it is possible for
a state that has relied heavily and relatively uncritically on foreign investment to
complement this approach with successful efforts to develop an indigenous
industry.
Of course, the generalizability of the FDS model or any other model will
depend on the politics of globalization itself. I argue that national development
projects are now organized in the context of a networked economy and polity, and
that states now create development projects not between the local and the global
but out of the local and the global. As Neil Brenner points out, the state itself
undergoes a process of “rescaling” as a “glocal” state emerges, integrated with
local and global networks, and building a variety of development projects through
those networks.
186 POLITICS & SOCIETY
There is no doubt that a neoliberal globalization project dominates this “net-
work polity” and is being enforced by transnational institutions.82 However, to
characterize globalization as simply a project of neoliberalism, within which
transnational capital dominates to the extent that states are doomed to the status of
“competition states,”83 is to miss the political possibilities that exist within the cur-
rent economy and polity. These possibilities are clear in the variety of local and
national responses to the pressures of globalization. They are also present in the
potential for transforming the project of globalization itself.
Fritz Scharpf argues that in the EU, where transnational governmental institu-
tions are most developed, “negative integration” through eliminating barriers to
trade has dominated over “positive integration” through the creation of new mar-
ket-regulating institutions at the transnational level. This favors the dominance of
regional development strategies through tax competition and other strategies for
attracting mobile investment. However, an agenda of positive integration may
come to favor regionalized networking strategies as a more developmentally sus-
tainable alternative. The Irish software industry has connected to each side of the
European polity—negotiating special tax status with the European Commission
to attract investment while simultaneously funding indigenous research, business
development, and industry support through European Structural Funds and other
schemes. Supranational governance, although dominated by neoliberal ap-
proaches, may yet be steered in alternative directions, and the EU in particular
may yet reflect the social democratic aspirations of many of its member states.
Indeed, Scharpf suggests that the strengthening of the EU state bureaucracy’s
hand in promoting positive integration is the most likely strategy for successfully
creating such a regulatory system.84 Such a EU bureaucracy is itself likely to be
very “loosely coupled” indeed. National strategies matter in terms of constructing
the specific balance between the global-led, local-led, and nationally mediated
modes of integration into the global economy. However, transnational regulation
is critical in shaping the political struggles over such development paths.
Ireland has pursued all three modes of integration into the global economy
with some degree of success, which explains its rapid growth in the 1990s. It has
been possible to pursue each path successfully while reconciling the three modes
of integraton within the same polity due to the emergence of an FDS. However, the
internal contradictions of that strategy are now creating perhaps unmanageable
tensions, brought on by the relative weakness of the solidaristic institutions of
national corporatism. The challenge to the Irish economy may not be to the devel-
opment process as much as to egalitarianism within the society and economy. The
Irish FDS may be a better basis for such mobilizations than the Asian BDS, given
its decentralized professional networks and union participation instead of hierar-
chical firms and union suppression. Such national egalitarian politics would have
to be combined with efforts at the transnational level to advance a positive integra-
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tion of national economies, limiting the destructive tendencies toward regulatory
competition. Any such political project that does emerge is increasingly likely to
wage its battles on the terrain currently staked out by the FDS.
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